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ABSTRACT
Medical information has a special status among the various items of personal
information. The introduction of information technology (IT) has changed the handling
of medical information in ways that are both promising for improving health care as well
as threatening to the individual patient's medical information privacy.
The challenge to business practitioners is to manage medical information intelligently
and to avoid the negative consequences of mismanaging this information, which may
include customer backlash in the forms of boycotts, lawsuits, and loss of company
reputation. This challenge is particularly important in the context of the U.S. National
Health Information Network initiative, which has the potential of sending electronic
medical information to IT devices worldwide in the not too distant future.
INTRODUCTION
In his 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush stated that, by
computerizing health records, it would be possible to avoid dangerous medical mistakes,
reduce
medical
costs,
and
improve
medical
care
www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html accessed June 3, 2006
from the White House website). Drawing on a report from the Institute of Medicine
(2001) and on the conclusions of a panel of IT experts, Kaushal et al. (2005) reported that
the creation of a National Health Information Network (NHIN) electronically connecting
together physician's offices, hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies,
clinical laboratories, payers, and pharmacies will be possible at a cost of $156 billion.
Though the NHIN will undoubtedly result in money savings and an increase in the
quality of medical care, it will also have major implications for the future of medical
information privacy. This paper will examine these implications from the perspective of
the business organization. Since all business organizations will have access to
individuals' medical information in the near future, managers must be aware of the
importance of handling medical information properly so as to avoid potential damage to
his/her organization.
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Medical Information Privacy
An individual's medical information can take many forms such as text, photographs,
video, x-ray, sound, etc. One definition of information that is directly relevant to medical
information privacy is data that have been evaluated to be relevant and useful for making
particular decisions or classes of decisions (King and Epstein, 1976). Though the
account was originally provided for the context of business management decision
making, it is clearly applicable to the situation of various medical practitioners. Data on
patients are collected and stored with a view toward retrieving them later to aid
physicians and other health professionals in making informed, intelligent decisions that
will lead to better patient health. Evaluation is central in this setting since it is the
medical practitioner who judges whether or not the data are relevant and useful in a
specific context. Data that are relevant and useful in a specific context take on the status
of information. Data that are not relevant and useful in a specific context remain simply
data that may become relevant and useful at another time and/or in another context by a
medical practitioner or someone related to or allied with a medical practitioner either
directly or indirectly (e.g. a business associate).
Cate (1997) identified a number of conceptions of what constitutes privacy from the
literature. Privacy has been viewed as an expression of one's personality or personhood,
focusing on the right of the individual to define his or her essence as a human being; as
autonomy - the moral freedom of the individual to engage in his or her own thoughts,
actions, and decisions; as citizens' ability to regulate information about themselves, and
thus control their relationships with other human beings; and as secrecy, anonymity and
solitude. In the area of medical information, the definition of privacy as "the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others" (Westin, 1967, p. 7) is
appropriate.
The Westin defmition is consistent with the confidential relationship between doctor and
patient. Confidentiality refers to how data collected for approved purposes will be
maintained and used by the individual, group or institution that collected it, what further
uses will be made of them, and when individuals will be required to consent to such uses.
In this regard, privacy may be construed as a balance struck by society between an
individual's right to keep information confidential and the societal benefit derived from
sharing the information for the purposes of medical research and public health
management, and how the balance is codified into legislation giving individuals the
means to control information about themselves (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993;
Rindfleisch, 1997).
The Medical Record
Traditionally medical data were collected and stored as records in physician's offices and
in hospitals. Often the data were recorded manually and retrieved manually. Patient data
forms
the
medical
record
and
its
contents
(www.eff.org/Privacy/Medical/1993_ota_medical_privacy.report; retrieved Jrme 8, 2006
from the Electronic Frontier Foundation website). Medical records may contain patient

Communications of the IIMA

34

20076 Volume 6 Issue 4

Szewczak

The Future of Medical Information Privacy

data such as name, address, age, next of kin, names of parents, date and place of birth
marital status, religion, history of military service. Social Security number, name of
insurer, complaints and diagnoses, medical history, family history, previous and current
treatments, an inventory of the condition of each body system, medications taken now
and in the past, use of alcohol and tobacco, diagnostic tests administered, and findings,
reactions and incidents. Records may also contain subjective information based on
impressions and assessments by health care workers such as mental ability and
psychological stability and status. In addition to data about the patient s current
condition, a patient's medical record may also contain the results of genetic research and
testing that enable predictions of future medical conditions and the prospects of
developing specific medical problems.
Typically the creation and maintenance of medical records was done by manually health
professionals. But IT has changed this practice (Kilman and Forslund, 1997). Notes
hand-written by doctors and nurses are being put into electronic form in the name of
faster, more extensive access to needed information. Healthcare companies are
competing to get doctors to write prescriptions over the Internet and to persuade people to
place their personal health records on the Internet (Consumer Reports, 2000). Companies
have made available software that an individual can use to create an Internet-based
"personal health record" that can be used to organize family medical histories, including
medical conditions, medications and allergies. These personal records may be
transmitted to health professionals over a computer network (Rubenstein, 2005).
Medical records are available online to medical practitioners for the purposes of decision
making and improving healthcare. They are also available to other users and institutions
in non-treatment contexts. Medical records are used to conduct federal governmentmandated medical community audits of physician competency and performance. They
are also used by insurance companies in the assessment of an applicant's eligibility for
health and life insurance and in claims processing to detect medical fraud. Medical
information is also used by private employers, educational institutions, credit
investigators, and law enforcement agencies for a variety of non-medical reasons.
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CONCERNS ABOUT MEDICAL INFORMATION
PRIVACY
As personal information, medical information has a special status. As Krzysztof and
Moore (2002) observe (p. 15):
Medical information about the individual patient is considered highly private, and
the general public is extremely fearful about disclosure....We all enjoy the
benefits of medical research conducted on other patients, but we are very often
reluctant to contribute or release our own information for such purposes. When
medical data are published it is expected that the researchers will maintain the
dignity of the individual patient, and that the results will be used for socially
beneficial purposes.
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This observation has been supported by various public opinion polls conducted since
1993 that have uncovered a basic concern people have about the privacy of their medical
records and how these records may be used (www.epic.org/privacy/medical/polls.html;
retrieved April 17, 2006 from the Electronic Privacy Information Center website). Major
areas of concern are:
Employment/career advancement. People are concemed that employers may use
personal health information to limit job opportunities. They are also concemed that
medical information will be used for many non-health purposes, such as determining
promotions and job advancement.
Insurance eligibility. People are concemed that insurance companies may use personal
health information to deny an application for various kinds of insurance coverage (e.g.
medical insurance).
Computerized versus paper records. The trend toward computerizing the healthcare
system and keeping records electronically threatens medical information privacy. People
feel more secure when medical records are kept in paper form.
Genetics research. People do not want medical researchers to be allowed to study an
individual's genetic information without obtaining the individual's consent.
Medical records security. People feel protecting the confidentiality of medical records is
essential to health care reform. Weak data security may lead to leaks of sensitive health
information. People also think that insurance companies get more information from
doctors than is needed.
Mistrust of government. People worry that existing federal health privacy mles
protecting patient information may be reduced or ignored in the name of efficiency. In
addition, people fear that government agencies and researchers are allowed to see
medical records without a patient's permission.
It should be noted that much of the business research that has been done on information
privacy has focused on individual consumers' general attitudes and concerns about their
information privacy (Straub and Collins, 1990; Culnan, 1993; Dhillon and Moores, 2001)
and the development of instruments to gather data about these attitudes and concems
(Smith, Milberg and Bmke, 1996; Malhotra, Kim and Agarwal, 2004). The fact that
people care about their privacy is generally evident from instances of public outcry in
reaction to companies' seeming insensitivity to privacy concems. For example, in 1990
Equifax and Lotus Development Corporation produced a series of computer disks on
winch were stored the names, addresses, buying habits and income information of
roughly 120,000,000 American consumers. The disks were made available for sale to the
public. Consumer inquiries and complaints caused the companies to discontinue the
disks (Culnan, 1993). In another more recent example, Facebook.com added a feature
that makes it easier for users to keep abreast of their friends by tracking users' activities
on the website. It then communicated these activities to all the people in the fiiends'
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social network. In an apparently unexpected reaction, hundreds of thousands of
Facebook.com users expressed outrage at what they perceived as an xmwarranted use of
their personal information (Warren and Vara, 2006). On the basis of these incidents, it
appears highly likely that people's response to the mishandling of their medical
information will result in a negative reaction against any organization responsible for the
mismanagement of this special class of information.
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
One might think that legislation addressing the issues and problems of
safeguarding medical information would solve many of the problems involving the
mishandling of medical information. However, the effectiveness of legislation in
establishing and maintaining medical information privacy is questionable at best, despite
legislative efforts to the contrary. The U.S. Bill of Rights does not address privacy issues
at all. However, in Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965)), the Supreme Court
formd sources for a right to privacy in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the Constitution in the form of "zones" or "penumbras" of privacy
(www.eff.org/Privacy/Medical/1993_ota_medical_privacy.report; retrieved May 22,
2006 from the Electronic Frontier Foundation website). A major modem discussion of an
information privacy right is Whalen v. Roe (429 U.S. 589 (1977)) wherein the Supreme
Court accepted that a right of privacy includes a generalized "right to be let alone," which
includes "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." The Court
noted that it was "not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amoimts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files." However, the Court has not expanded on this idea in any significant
way (National Research Council, 1977).
Federal and state governments have attempted to deal with privacy issues in ways
that satisfy the needs of various stakeholders such as doctors, insurance companies,
researchers, law enforcement, and data processing firms as well as individuals. The
result has been various legislative measures that provide legal compromise. For our
purposes, the most significant measure is the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
The first comprehensive set of federal regulations of health information is
provided by HIPAA. It provides for two mles related directly to medical information
privacy: the Privacy Rule (45 Code of Federal Regulations 164.500 - 164.534) and the
Security Rule (45 Code of Federal Regulations 164.103 - 164.318)
(www.archives.gov/federal-register/index.html; retrieved June 10, 2006 from the Federal
Register archives website).
The HIPAA Privacy Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides the federal floor of privacy of protected health
information (PHI) in the U.S. It only applies to medical records maintained by "covered
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entities" (health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses/data
processing firms) in any form (electronic or non-electronic, including oral). It allows
more stringent state laws to continue in force. An individual has a number of rights
under the Privacy Rule including the following (adapted and expanded firom
www.epic.org/privacy/medical; retrieved April 17, 2006 fiom the Electronic Privacy
Information Center website):
•
•
•

•
•
•

To access, inspect and copy PHI held by hospitals, clinics, health plans and other
"covered entities" with some exceptions
To request amendments to PHI held by covered entities
To request an accoxmting of disclosures that have been made without
authorization to anyone other than the individual for purposes other than
treatment, payment and "health care operations" (i.e., medical practice
evaluations for accreditation conducted by organizations such as the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the National
Committee for Quality Assurance)
To receive a Notice of Privacy Practices from doctors, hospitals, health plans and
others in the healthcare system
To request restrictions on uses and disclosures of PHI
To complain about privacy practices to a covered entity and to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services

Security risks to medical information may come from inside a business as well as from
external sources. There are a number of intemal security risks such as accidental
disclosures, insider curiosity, releasing medical information to outsiders for revenge,
spite or profit, and imcontrolled support functions (Rindfleisch, 1997). The Privacy Rule
includes civil and criminal penalties for violations of an individual's privacy. Criminal
penalties can approach $250,000 and/or 10 years imprisonment if the offense is
committed with intent to sell, transfer or use PHI for commercial or personal gain, or for
malicious harm. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is charged with enforcing the Privacy
Rule.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not prohibit the disclosme of PHI when such disclosure is
required or permitted by other federal law. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
does not prohibit the sharing of information among affiliated companies (such as banks
and brokerages, which are not covered entities). So an individual's credit card accormt
transactions may include data about where an individual goes for health care, and this
data may be shared among affiliated companies and is not protected by HIPAA. The
HIPAA Privacy Rule also explicitly includes exceptions to the rules for use and
disclosure. In fact, there are a number of uses and disclosures of information for which
an authorization or opportunity to agree or object is not required (for example, for
judicial and administrative proceedings, and for law enforcement purposes), including the
use of PHI for marketing purposes (which, according to the Department of Health and
Human Services, may be too difficult to distinguish from treatment purposes)
(www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8a-hipaa.htm; retrieved June 16, 2006 from the Privacy
Rights website).
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It should be noted that there may be different incentives at work on the parts of health
care providers and data collection organizations. The health care provider may wish to
secure services in the patient's best interest without disclosing unnecessary information.
The data collection organization may be motivated mainly by financial considerations
(Yang & Kombarakaran, 2006). The HIPAA Privacy Rule is particularly difficult to
implement when it comes to managing business associates under contract who perform
an action on the health care provider's behalf and to whom the health care provider is
releasing PHI. These business associates often have free access to a patient's PHI. They
include people such as insurance agents, billing agents, consultants, and transcriptionists.
If a health care provider discovers that a business associate has breached or violated a
contract with respect to safeguarding PHI, the health care provider must take reasonable
steps to remedy the problem or terminate the contract. If the contract cannot be
terminated, the health care provider must report the problem to the OCR, which may
exact civil penalties against the business associate (Wilson, 2006).
However a health professional may not know that a business associate has breached or
violated a contract with regard to safeguarding PHI. Because HIPAA does not prohibit
the sharing of PHI among various covered entities or their business associates, PHI could
be used in ways other than for treatment or billing. For example, an individual could be
charged higher loan rates because of some piece of data in his/her medical record, and it
would be impossible to prove the data were shared because there is no required disclosure
audit for non-covered entities.
In addition, data networks may be Internet-based and global in reach. Individual health
records may be transmitted overseas and handled by subcontractors in ways the
individual is completely unaware of and would object to under any circumstances.
Another related security challenge is the data breach. A hacker or even a trusted
employee can steal data from a computer system and offer them for sale to interested
parties (Consumer Reports, 2006). Also, if the history of dotcom business is any guide,
companies that run into financial difficulties may choose to sell customer data to meet
obligations, even though the companies have published privacy policies.
The HIPAA Security Rule
The HIPAA Security Rule provides security standards and implementation specifications
for three kinds of safeguards (administrative, physical and technical) to protect PHI in
electronic form. It also divides the implementation specifications into required and
addressable (i.e., not required but recommended). Covered entities have a certain amount
of flexibility in implementing addressable specifications. In deciding which security
measures to adopt, the covered entity must consider its own size, complexity and
capabilities, its technical infrastructure, hardware and software security capabilities, the
costs of the security measures, and the probability and criticality of potential risks to
electronic PHI. For example, covered entities may choose to adopt encryption as a
technical safeguard for the transmission security standard. But since encryption is given
as an addressable implementation specification, it is not required by HIPAA but simply
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recommended. In addition, while encryption and other technologies may keep patient
data private and secure, it is what people who have access to the decrypted data do with it
that is important to the issue of medical information privacy (Rindfleisch, 1997; Patton,
2005).
HIPAA is not specific as to the exact technology that should be used to implement
transmission security, since technology changes and progresses in ways that are difficult
to predict. Current implementation of transmission security will most likely involve the
use of firewalls, user authentication, encryption/decryption, anti-virus/malware software,
and anonymizers (Cheng & Himg, 2006). These implementation choices will be replaced
as newer, more effective technologies become available.
THE NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION NETWORK
The U.S. federal government is promoting a national system of electronic health records
(EHRs) and the building of a National (aka Nationwide) Health Information Network
(NHIN) which will connect EHRs to health care providers, insmers, pharmacies,
laboratories, and claims processors (Kaushal, et al., 2005). HIPAA makes explicit
mention of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). However implementation of EDI by
covered entities has resulted in many proprietary EDI formats, resulting in a lack of
common industry-wide standards. This lack of uniformity is viewed as a major obstacle
to realizing potential efficiency and savings (45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 162).
Since EDI has been replaced by the use of TCP/IP in Internet networks, it is likely that
any future NHIN will use TCP/IP as its fundamental protocol, perhaps together with
legacy systems for a time (www.amia.org/pubs/symposia/D005234.pdf; Retrieved
September 3, 2006 fi-om the American Medical Informatics Association website);
Deshmukh & Croasdell, 2005; Cheng & Hung, 2006). Four companies (Accenture,
Computer Science Corporation, IBM and Northrop Grumman) have been selected the
Department of Health and Human Services to develop regional versions of the NHIN
with a view toward developing interoperability in the near future.
Medical Databases
Medical databases will be major sources of medical information on the NHIN. However
a database is implemented, the EHRs comprising it will be accessed by many interested
parties over the NHIN.
One of the largest central databases of EHRs is the Medical Information Bureau (MEB).
It is shared by insurance companies to obtain information about life insurance and
individual health insurance policy applicants. If the applicant reports a condition that the
insurer considers significant, or if the results of a required examination, blood test, or
urine test raise questions for the insurer, the insurer will report that information to the
MTR MTB EHRs consist of codes indicating a particular condition or lifestyle (such as
the individual smokes cigarettes). As such, MIB does not include the totality of an
individual's medical record (www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8a-hipaa.htm; retrieved June 16,
2006 from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse website)
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Another example is the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP). CHOP is collecting
DNA profiles on as many as 100,000 child patients in order to develop an anonymous
database that researchers can use to study children's genetic profiles. Research results
may reveal which genes rmderlie problems affecting children such as diabetes, obesity,
asthma and cancer. This research could lead to the development of diagnostic tests and
drugs. By linVing genetic information to EHRs, CHOP may obtain research funds and
patents and forge partnerships with drug companies (Regalado, 2006).
There are a number of benefits as well as disadvantages of medical databases
(www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/privacy-main.html; retrieved April 26, 2006 from the U.S.
Department of Education website). Among the benefits are.
•

A patient's medical information would be immediately available to an attending
doctor, including life saving information
• Researchers would be able to track certain diseases as well as patients' responses
to certain drugs
• Medical databases would allow for better organization and more legibility of
medical files
• EHRs may be more secure than paper records since security systems can monitor
medical databases

Among the disadvantages of medical databases are:
•
•
•

Employers may access medical information about their employees which they
might use to deny employment or job advancement
Insurers may use medical information to deny insurance to people they consider
to be high risk
Digitizing medical records will allow many more people legitimate access to
medical records, with the increased possibility that the information may be
misused by one or more of them

It is important to note that, in general, inaccuracies in databases are widespread and that
the ability of individuals to detect these inaccuracies is limited (Straub & Collins, 1990).
In addition, the problem of missing values - values accidentally not entered or purposely
not obtained for technical, economic or ethical reasons - is widely encormtered in
medical databases since medical data are collected as a byproduct of patient care
activities rather than rigorously collected and evaluated for use in research (Krzysztof &
Moore, 2002). These inaccuracies and omissions only accentuate the disadvantages of
medical databases.
In addition to medical databases available on the NHIN, there are other sources of
medical information available to businesses at large, including company and government
databases, public records, and customer volunteered medical information.
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Medical Information in Company and Government Databases
Businesses may acquire medical information that is contained in companies' non-medical
databases as a result of acquiring these databases in the course of merger/acquisition
activities. They may also have access to medical information in other companies' non
medical databases in the course of maintaining friendly strategic alliances with these
companies.
In addition, business associates of healthcare practitioners are in a position to collect and
store medical information in company databases for use in business decisions (for
example, determining loan rates). As was discussed earlier, HIPAA does not prohibit the
sharing of PHI among various covered entities or their business associates.
Various federal, state and local governments maintain databases of personal (including
medical) information. As Consumer Reports (2000, p. 23) notes:
The federal government maintains electronic files of hrmdreds of millions
of Medicare claims. And every state aggregates medical data on its
inhabitants, including registries of births, deaths, immunizations, and
commimicable diseases. But most states go much further. Thirty-seven
mandate collection of electronic records of every hospital discharge.
Thirty-nine maintain registries of every newly diagnosed case of cancer.
Most of these databases are available to any member of the public
[emphasis added] who asks for them and can operate the database
software required to read and manipulate them.
Although many of these government database records are stripped of information which
could be used to identify individuals (such as Social Security numbers), it is still possible
to link the records to private sector medical records using standard codes for diagnoses
and procedures employed by the United States healthcare system. The codes are usually
included on insurance claims and hospital discharge records. In addition, a patient's
anonymity may be compromised by the fact that personally identifiable health
information is needed for a variety of research purposes (e.g. to check for duplicate
records
or
redundant
cases,
and
for
longitudinal
studies)
(www.epic.org/privacy/medical/GAO-medical-privacy-399.pdf; retrieved May 17, 2006
from the Electronic Privacy Information Center website).
Straub & Collins (1990) relate how a user can retrieve information about a specific
person from large statistical databases with a small number of unsophisticated queries.
As a case in point, a computer privacy researcher at Camegie Mellon University was able
to retrieve the health records of the governor of Massachusetts from an "anonymous"
database of state employee health insurance claims by knowing his birth date and ZIP
code. The researcher demonstrated that she could do the same for 69% of the 54,805
registered voters on the Cambridge, MA voting list (Consumer Reports, 2000).
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Medical Information From Public Records
Electronically available public records (e.g. court records) are also a source of an
individual's medical information (Ogles, 2004). An individual's medical record may be
entered into court documents (say, if an individual sues over payment claims) which are
available on-line. Public records also have a connection to junk mail, since counties have
sold information from public records to commercial companies that then repackage it and
resell it to other companies and individuals (Leach, 2004). Junk mail in itself may not be
overly troublesome to an individual. But what these companies and individuals may do
with public record information in addition to creating and sending junk mail is cause for
some concern.
Consumer Volunteered Medical Information
Much personal health information that is available to the public is volunteered by
individuals themselves, by responding to 800 numbers, coupon offers, rebate offers md
Web site registration. The information is included in commercial databases like
Behavior-Bank sponsored by Experian, one of the world's largest direct-mail database
companies. This information is sold to clients interested in categories of health problems,
such as bladder control or high cholesterol. Drug companies are also interested in the
commercial databases (Consumer Reports, 2000). With the implementation of the NHIN,
this interest will be heightened as hospitals link up electronically with doctor offices'
records (Landro, 2006).
Data mining is often the rationale for wanting access to medical information. Data
mining of medical data offers the health care industry the ability to address issues related
to fraud detection and abuse, to profitability analysis, to patient profiling, and to patient
retention management (Payton, 2003). However, patients are often unaware that their
medical information is being used for data mining purposes, making it unlikely that
patients will object to the practice. The challenge to organizations that conduct data
mining with medical information is how to respond when and if patients become aware of
the data mining. For some patients, the awareness will make no difference; for others,
the reaction may be very negative. (See Culnan (1993) for a discussion of what
differentiates consumers who object to certain uses of personal information from those
who do not object.)
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL INFORMATION
Since companies have relatively easy access to individuals medical information, the
adequate protection of the privacy of this information must be considered an important
management challenge, especially in the context of the NHIN.
For healthcare-related businesses, the requirement to safeguard patients' medical
information is specified by HIPAA. This includes the following activities (Saul, 2000).
adequately safeguard an individual's medical
information acquired in
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mergers/acquisitions, from public records, from customer volunteers, or simply in the
course of doing business (for example, hiring new employees).
•

Develop policies to evaluate and certify that appropriate security measures are in
place in the business

•

Create legal contracts between the business and any business associates given
access to individually identifiable medical information requiring the business
associates to safeguard the data

•

Develop contingency plans for response to emergencies, in a data backup plan
and a disaster recovery plan

•

Establish a system of access control that includes policies for the authorization,
establishment and modification of access privileges

•

Perform ongoing intemal review of data access records in order to uncover
possible security violations

•

Supervise systems persoimel responsible for systems maintenance activities

•

Train system users in system security, including user education on virus
protection, monitoring login failures, password management, and how to report
discrepancies or suspicious activities

•

Establish termination procedures for when an employee leaves the business
(voluntarily or involuntarily) or whose data access privileges are revoked

For businesses in industries other than healthcare, the challenges center on how to
Though it is not required by law, businesses should attempt to respect as much as is
relevant and possible the rights of individuals imder the HIPAA Privacy Rule. For
example, businesses should honor individual requests to restrict the use and disclosure of
medical information. It is not simply a matter of behaving ethically. Calculating the
impact of a potential loss of medical information from a security breach is very difficult.
Customer backlash in response to a business' failure to safeguard medical information is
a very real and potentially costly possibility. Customer backlash could take the form of a
grassroots protest similar to what occurred recently with Facebook.com. Another
possibility is an expensive class action lawsuit that could last a protracted period of time.
Given how strongly people feel about the privacy of their medical information, either
form of backlash could also damage the business' public reputation, especially if the
backlash attracts the attention of the various news reporting agencies.
Finally businesses should also conform to the recommendations proposed by the HIPAA
Security Rule, especially with regard to transmission security of an individual's medical
information. Huston (2001) observes that managers and end users tend not to include
security requirements in a system during its design imless they have had the experience of
a security breach. Rather than wait for such a potentially damaging event to occur in the
sending or receiving of medical information, managers should heed the HIPAA Security
Rule recommendations and proactively implement security technology (in particular,
encryption/decryption technology) to preempt such an event. In the end, both managers
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and their customers will be better served when it comes to the issue of medical
information privacy.
CONCLUSION
Given the potential for mishandling medical information acquired in the course of doing
business, management must exercise vigilance in the safeguarding of this information.
Though many businesses are not typically interested in acquiring and dealing with
medical information, the possible negative consequences of mishandling medical
information that is acquired from various sources cannot be ignored. This basic reality
will only become magnified once the NHIN becomes a reality, making it technologically
possible to inadvertently disseminate medical information nationally as well as
internationally. Management must move to preempt these negative consequences before
serious damage to the reputation of the business occurs as a result of mishandling medical
information.
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